ERC-8426 NFT wallet pass extension (Wallet Pass Extension for NFTs)
Draft · NFTs & multi-token · created 2026-08-07
Announces in a standard way that an NFT contract is also offered as an Apple Wallet or Google Wallet pass, so that any wallet or marketplace can surface the add-to-wallet feature and handle ownership transfers safely.
Why it is needed
Wallet passes (Apple Wallet, Google Wallet) are programmable screens built into smartphones that can show real-time status and receive platform push updates without installing an app. Several NFT services already link on-chain state such as memberships, tickets, and loyalty points to wallet passes, but each project builds its own bespoke integration bridge. As a result, wallets, marketplaces, and indexers have no common way to discover which tokens have a pass, and there is no shared channel among pass issuers to signal that pass content is stale. In addition, security decisions such as how to link pass links to ownership and what to do when a token is transferred are redesigned independently for each integration, leading to inconsistent results across services.
What to implement
event PassUpdate(uint256 indexed tokenId);: Signals that the wallet pass content linked to a single token has changed.event BatchPassUpdate(uint256 fromTokenId, uint256 toTokenId);: Signals that the pass content for a contiguous range of tokens (inclusive of both ends) has changed all at once.function passURI(uint256 tokenId) external view returns (string memory);: Returns a URI pointing to that token's pass manifest. Fails if tokenId is invalid.function passIssuer() external view returns (string memory);: Returns, as JSON, the platform signer identity information used by this contract's passes.
In depth
Three roles: Contract, Pass Issuer, Client
This standard divides responsibility among three parties, each independently responsible. The Contract implements only the IERC721WalletPass interface, passURI, and events on-chain. The Pass Issuer is an off-chain server pointed to by passURI that serves the manifest, issues passes, and performs all authorization checks. The Client is the wallet app, marketplace, or indexer that reads the manifest and shows the add-to-wallet button or obtains the challenge signature. The Contract does not depend on any specific Pass Issuer or Client, and any Pass Issuer that meets the conditions can serve that Contract's tokens.
passURI and the pass manifest structure
passURI(tokenId) is a public view function with no access restriction; it fails if tokenId is invalid and returns a URI pointing to the pass manifest document. The manifest is JSON with the fields version (currently 1), formats (per-platform acquisition URLs, at least one, with apple and google keys defined and unknown keys ignored), updatedAt (optional, Unix timestamp of the last content change), and issuer (optional, platform signer identity information). The Pass Issuer must respond with Content-Type set to application/json, and in a public configuration may allow CORS headers as loosely as for public data.
Issuer identity commitment (passIssuer, optional)
A contract may optionally implement IERC721WalletPassIssuer (interface ID 0x470be7e9) to record platform signer information on-chain via the passIssuer() function. If implemented, the Pass Issuer must make the manifest's issuer field match this value exactly, and clients must compare the on-chain value, the manifest, and the actual pass signer against each other and reject installation on mismatch. A mismatch means either the server is issuing passes with a different signer, or an issuer rotation is underway that has not yet been recorded on-chain.
Acquisition URL: public and gated configurations
The acquisition URL is the address where a per-token pass is actually obtained. In a public configuration, the manifest is served without access control, and since passURI itself is a public view function, this URL cannot be treated as proof of ownership even if made capability-like. In a gated configuration, the manifest or pass can only be obtained after proof of control over the owning account, and only in this case can possession of the URL serve as proof of ownership. The Pass Issuer in a gated configuration must rotate the acquisition URL upon detecting a transfer or at the new owner's first claim, whichever comes first.
Gated acquisition: 401 and challenge
A manifest request without proof must respond (unless rate-limited) with HTTP 401 and a body containing error set to proof_required and a challenge field. The challenge endpoint accepts a GET request with an address query parameter and returns a challenge message; the client signs it and re-requests the manifest with two headers, Wallet-Pass-Proof (base64url message) and Wallet-Pass-Signature (0x hex signature). The Pass Issuer only returns the manifest, with Cache-Control: no-store, after verifying this proof against the challenge floor criteria and a fresh on-chain ownership lookup. Acquisition URLs are issued and rotated per account, and an account that lost entitlement and regains eligibility is treated as a 'first claim' and receives a new URL.
Authorization of pass-triggered actions: two checks
Any action that changes on-chain state through a pass must pass two independent checks. The first is proof of control over the owning account: a signature over a server-issued challenge that includes the token, action, a single-use nonce, an expiration time, and the verifier's identity. For an externally owned account this is verified via key signature, for a contract account via ERC-1271, and for a not-yet-deployed counterfactual account via ERC-6492, with the challenge recommended to use the ERC-4361 (Sign-In with Ethereum) format. The second is a fresh on-chain ownerOf lookup (at the latest block) at request time, confirming who owns the token now rather than at the time of issuance or URL creation. The first check blocks cases where the pass or link leaks and gets forwarded, and the second check closes the transfer window during which a pass would keep working even after the token is sold. If only one check exists, the other hole remains wide open.
When there is no signature: the capability configuration
Custodial services onboarded by email have the server holding the keys, so a user signature cannot be obtained for every action. In such cases, under a capability configuration, an unguessable high-entropy URL can stand in for proof of ownership control (check 1), but under strict conditions. The link must be bound to the token, action, and issuing account, must rotate on transfer or at the owner's request, must not be able to trigger token transfers, burns, or approvals or changes to entitlements or permissions, and its repeat-execution effects must be bounded and documented. The second check (fresh ownership lookup) still applies without exception under this configuration. This substitution is a tradeoff that gives up forwarding prevention in exchange for explicitly limiting the scope of the resulting damage.
Proposal status: Draft
This ERC is currently in Draft status, an early draft still under community discussion and revision. Details of the interface identifiers, manifest fields, and authorization flows may change before final confirmation.
Things to watch out for
- Passes Are Bearer Artifacts: Pass files can be copied, forwarded, and installed on multiple devices, and platforms generally do not enforce uniqueness. Treating possession as ownership creates a confused deputy: anyone holding a shared pass can exercise the owner's privileges. Proof of ownership and a fresh lookup each close a different hole, so omitting either reopens that hole.
- Freshness Is Not Absolute: A fresh lookup narrows the transfer window but does not eliminate it entirely. Because the lookup is based on the latest block, if the chain head is reorganized, an already-completed transfer risks being treated as if it never happened.
- Guessable Links: Pass download and action links that can be guessed from public data alone, such as the token ID, let anyone who can read the chain receive the pass or trigger the action. For this reason every acquisition URL must be a capability URL.
- Capabilities Recoverable From Storage: Storing capabilities as issued, or leaving them derivable from stored values alone, means that if the storage leaks, every link and pass can be recovered at once. Storage should only be looked up by digest, or derived from a secret kept outside storage.
- Capability URL Leakage: Acquisition URLs and action links can be exposed through email, chat, device backups, screenshots, screen recordings, and the like. Entropy prevents guessing and rotation limits how long a leak stays exploitable, but a URL embedded in a public configuration manifest is public data regardless of its entropy.