ERC-8426 NFT wallet pass extension (Wallet Pass Extension for NFTs)

Draft · NFTs & multi-token · created 2026-08-07

Announces in a standard way that an NFT contract is also offered as an Apple Wallet or Google Wallet pass, so that any wallet or marketplace can surface the add-to-wallet feature and handle ownership transfers safely.

Why it is needed

Wallet passes (Apple Wallet, Google Wallet) are programmable screens built into smartphones that can show real-time status and receive platform push updates without installing an app. Several NFT services already link on-chain state such as memberships, tickets, and loyalty points to wallet passes, but each project builds its own bespoke integration bridge. As a result, wallets, marketplaces, and indexers have no common way to discover which tokens have a pass, and there is no shared channel among pass issuers to signal that pass content is stale. In addition, security decisions such as how to link pass links to ownership and what to do when a token is transferred are redesigned independently for each integration, leading to inconsistent results across services.

What to implement

In depth

Three roles: Contract, Pass Issuer, Client

This standard divides responsibility among three parties, each independently responsible. The Contract implements only the IERC721WalletPass interface, passURI, and events on-chain. The Pass Issuer is an off-chain server pointed to by passURI that serves the manifest, issues passes, and performs all authorization checks. The Client is the wallet app, marketplace, or indexer that reads the manifest and shows the add-to-wallet button or obtains the challenge signature. The Contract does not depend on any specific Pass Issuer or Client, and any Pass Issuer that meets the conditions can serve that Contract's tokens.

passURI and the pass manifest structure

passURI(tokenId) is a public view function with no access restriction; it fails if tokenId is invalid and returns a URI pointing to the pass manifest document. The manifest is JSON with the fields version (currently 1), formats (per-platform acquisition URLs, at least one, with apple and google keys defined and unknown keys ignored), updatedAt (optional, Unix timestamp of the last content change), and issuer (optional, platform signer identity information). The Pass Issuer must respond with Content-Type set to application/json, and in a public configuration may allow CORS headers as loosely as for public data.

Issuer identity commitment (passIssuer, optional)

A contract may optionally implement IERC721WalletPassIssuer (interface ID 0x470be7e9) to record platform signer information on-chain via the passIssuer() function. If implemented, the Pass Issuer must make the manifest's issuer field match this value exactly, and clients must compare the on-chain value, the manifest, and the actual pass signer against each other and reject installation on mismatch. A mismatch means either the server is issuing passes with a different signer, or an issuer rotation is underway that has not yet been recorded on-chain.

Acquisition URL: public and gated configurations

The acquisition URL is the address where a per-token pass is actually obtained. In a public configuration, the manifest is served without access control, and since passURI itself is a public view function, this URL cannot be treated as proof of ownership even if made capability-like. In a gated configuration, the manifest or pass can only be obtained after proof of control over the owning account, and only in this case can possession of the URL serve as proof of ownership. The Pass Issuer in a gated configuration must rotate the acquisition URL upon detecting a transfer or at the new owner's first claim, whichever comes first.

Gated acquisition: 401 and challenge

A manifest request without proof must respond (unless rate-limited) with HTTP 401 and a body containing error set to proof_required and a challenge field. The challenge endpoint accepts a GET request with an address query parameter and returns a challenge message; the client signs it and re-requests the manifest with two headers, Wallet-Pass-Proof (base64url message) and Wallet-Pass-Signature (0x hex signature). The Pass Issuer only returns the manifest, with Cache-Control: no-store, after verifying this proof against the challenge floor criteria and a fresh on-chain ownership lookup. Acquisition URLs are issued and rotated per account, and an account that lost entitlement and regains eligibility is treated as a 'first claim' and receives a new URL.

Authorization of pass-triggered actions: two checks

Any action that changes on-chain state through a pass must pass two independent checks. The first is proof of control over the owning account: a signature over a server-issued challenge that includes the token, action, a single-use nonce, an expiration time, and the verifier's identity. For an externally owned account this is verified via key signature, for a contract account via ERC-1271, and for a not-yet-deployed counterfactual account via ERC-6492, with the challenge recommended to use the ERC-4361 (Sign-In with Ethereum) format. The second is a fresh on-chain ownerOf lookup (at the latest block) at request time, confirming who owns the token now rather than at the time of issuance or URL creation. The first check blocks cases where the pass or link leaks and gets forwarded, and the second check closes the transfer window during which a pass would keep working even after the token is sold. If only one check exists, the other hole remains wide open.

When there is no signature: the capability configuration

Custodial services onboarded by email have the server holding the keys, so a user signature cannot be obtained for every action. In such cases, under a capability configuration, an unguessable high-entropy URL can stand in for proof of ownership control (check 1), but under strict conditions. The link must be bound to the token, action, and issuing account, must rotate on transfer or at the owner's request, must not be able to trigger token transfers, burns, or approvals or changes to entitlements or permissions, and its repeat-execution effects must be bounded and documented. The second check (fresh ownership lookup) still applies without exception under this configuration. This substitution is a tradeoff that gives up forwarding prevention in exchange for explicitly limiting the scope of the resulting damage.

Proposal status: Draft

This ERC is currently in Draft status, an early draft still under community discussion and revision. Details of the interface identifiers, manifest fields, and authorization flows may change before final confirmation.

Things to watch out for

Original ERC · ← ERCs