EIP-8425 Quantum freeze and account recovery

No call decision · Security & privacy · EIP status Draft · created 2026-09-27

In preparation for a scenario where a quantum computer could break ECDSA signatures, this EIP suspends authentication via existing ECDSA signatures across the board and predefines two recovery paths for reclaiming frozen accounts.

Why it is needed

Most Ethereum accounts today are protected by a digital signature scheme called secp256k1 ECDSA. If a sufficiently powerful quantum computer emerges that can actually break this signature, an attacker could take the assets of any account that has not migrated to a quantum-resistant scheme. Accounts whose owners have lost access and cannot migrate themselves remain exposed as well. If freeze and recovery rules are drawn up hastily after such an emergency hits, the implementation burden would be very large. This EIP argues that preparing the rules in advance reduces the implementation work needed in an emergency and gives owners who still hold adequate evidence a way to reclaim their accounts, and on that basis defines a framework for the freeze time and recovery procedure ahead of time.

What changes

Today

After EIP-8425

Who is affected

In depth

Two time parameters

SAFE_RECOVERY_TIME is the exclusive timestamp cutoff separating qualifying recovery commitments, and QUANTUM_FREEZE_TIME is the global Unix timestamp at which the freeze rules take effect. Both values are still TBD. SAFE_RECOVERY_TIME is a consensus parameter chosen before recovery is activated, and cannot be later than QUANTUM_FREEZE_TIME, including in cases where the freeze is moved earlier. If no cutoff is set, commitment-based recovery is disabled. QUANTUM_FREEZE_TIME can be set in advance as a scheduled migration deadline, and in a genuine emergency where ECDSA is actually broken, validators and node operators can coordinate to move it earlier. Any changed time must be adopted consistently across the network before it takes effect.

Freeze rules

In any block where block.timestamp >= QUANTUM_FREEZE_TIME, a transaction authenticated by a secp256k1 ECDSA sender signature is invalid. EIP-7702 ECDSA authorization tuples can no longer be used to install, replace, or remove a delegation. However, delegation indicators already set remain in place, and delegated code can still be invoked under its corresponding execution rules. This is designed so that wallets that already support quantum-resistant authentication can keep using the transaction type that employs quantum-resistant sender authentication.

Removal of the ecRecover precompile

Only the precompile behavior at address 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000001 is removed at the same point in time. The account itself remains in state unchanged, with its balance, nonce, code, and storage untouched. CALL, CALLCODE, DELEGATECALL, and STATICCALL to this address follow the normal account-call rules, including gas, call depth, balance checks, static context, and revert rules. Since the account has no code, a successful call returns empty return data, a successful CALL transfers the value passed, and on revert the balance is restored to its pre-transfer state. This address is also excluded from the set of precompiles that EIP-2929 adds to accessed_addresses at the start of transaction execution, so access and calls are gas-metered under the active fork's normal account rules.

Recovery targets and two paths

Recovery is limited to accounts whose code is empty or that carry an EIP-7702 delegation designator. Accounts with ordinary deployed code are excluded, including accounts that migrated under EIP-8298. There are two paths. First, commitment-based recovery proves authority under a valid, non-revoked commitment that was in regular state immediately before SAFE_RECOVERY_TIME, without relying on the original ECDSA private key. Second, proof-of-ownership recovery proves knowledge of the original seed bound to the account without revealing the seed, and this proof must not be obtainable merely by recovering the ECDSA private key. This path requires no prior commitment, and a valid proof of the original seed authorizes recovery even after key rotation or a change of authority. On success, a quantum-resistant wallet is installed at the same address, the owner sets a signing key, and the legacy ECDSA path is not restored.

Design rationale

The commitment cutoff is separated from the freeze time so that a trust boundary earlier than the freeze's effective date can be set. If there is evidence of an earlier compromise, it can be reflected by choosing an earlier cutoff before recovery is activated. However, such reports and offline evidence are only reference material for coordination; clients do not adjudicate them or independently set the cutoff. Because the scheduled migration deadline and emergency response need the same freeze rule, there is a single freeze mechanism controlled by one value, QUANTUM_FREEZE_TIME. Merely blocking ECDSA-signed transactions still leaves contracts that authenticate via ecRecover exposed to forged signatures, so once an actual quantum break has occurred, preventing unauthorized asset transfers through this path is treated as taking priority over preserving functionality whose authentication assumptions have already collapsed.

Security considerations

Owners who hold only an ECDSA private key and have no eligible recovery commitment cannot recover through this EIP. If an actual quantum break occurred before disclosure, it may be necessary to coordinate on an earlier SAFE_RECOVERY_TIME before recovery is activated. Once ecRecover is removed, applications that use it for authentication need an alternative authentication or recovery path, assets whose only withdrawal path depends on this precompile may become inaccessible, and purely computational uses that recover an address from a signature also need an alternative. Because empty return data does not change the caller's output memory, contracts that only check call success or read output without validating the return data length may still accept unauthorized calls. Removing the precompile does not protect contracts that implement ECDSA verification themselves.

Open items and current status

This EIP's status is Draft, so its contents may still change. Many items remain undetermined. The two timestamp values, the recovery commitment mechanism, the recovery algorithm, the verification algorithm and proof system, test cases, and the reference implementation are all TBD. Adoption requires a hard fork, and it halts both existing ECDSA-signed transactions, including signatures created before activation, and precompile-based signature authentication. Quantum-resistant transaction submission and wallet support are prerequisites for activation. No core developer call decision to include this in a specific fork is currently on record.

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