EIP-8209 Commit-reveal transaction frame (Commit-Reveal Transaction Frames)

No call decision · Security & privacy · EIP status Draft · created 2026-04-01

Adds two modes, COMMIT and REVEAL, to frame transactions, so that a transaction's execution content is first placed in a block only as a hash and then revealed and executed in the next block. By making the content unviewable in advance, this blocks targeted front-running.

Why it is needed

Today, the full content of an Ethereum transaction is exposed in the mempool, the space where pending transactions gather, before it is included in a block. Because of this, participants called MEV searchers can see a user's trade in advance and carry out attacks such as front-running, sandwich attacks, back-running, and censorship. The profits from these attacks are large enough that they have had the side effect of concentrating block-production power in the hands of a small number of highly efficient value extractors. This proposal removes most of the attacker's advantage simply by introducing a one-block delay between when a transaction is included in a block and when its content is revealed. There are also proposals to encrypt the mempool itself (EIP-8184, EIP-8105), but such approaches are complex, which could make them hard for a rapidly scaling Ethereum to adopt. This proposal uses only a simple commit-reveal approach, with no new cryptographic techniques, no new consensus participant role, and no delay added to the block production path.

What changes

Today

After EIP-8209

Who is affected

In depth

COMMIT Frame (mode 0x05)

COMMIT is a new mode added to EIP-8141 frame transactions, with the structure [mode=0x05, flags=0, target=0x00, limits=[0, 0], value=0, data=commitment_hash]. Since flags is 0, there is no approval scope or atomic batching, and since target is 0x00, no contract is called at commitment time. Since limits is [0, 0], the frame itself does not execute EVM code, and value is also 0. data holds the 32-byte keccak256 hash of the execution payload. A transaction carrying a COMMIT must have the structure frames = [verify_frame(s), commitment_frame_1, ..., commitment_frame_k]. Because the verify frame prepays execution gas in the current block, the validity of the included transaction is guaranteed, and the verify frame does not need to directly reveal the sender information of the execution payload.

REVEAL Frame (mode 0x06)

REVEAL is broadcast to the mempool as a separate frame transaction (frames = [reveal_frame1, ...]) using the same structure as a regular frame with mode=0x06. All REVEAL transactions must be included at the very front of block N, ahead of any other transaction, and a REVEAL frame cannot be mixed with other modes in the same transaction. Sender handling is the same as a DEFAULT frame, so the caller is ENTRY_POINT. All approval-scope bits in flags must be 0, so no payer is set and blob_versioned_hashes must be empty. The EIP-8141 rule that a transaction is invalid if no frame sets a payer does not apply to REVEAL. max_cost is not collected and there is no payer_refund; gas is paid from the escrow set up at commitment time, and the fees field is not used. A single REVEAL frame may be marked as consuming multiple COMMIT frames, allowing it to use a gas limit larger than COMMIT_GAS_RESERVATION.

Gas escrow, refund, and burn

When a COMMIT is included in block N-1, the VERIFY frame executes normally and sets the gas payer via APPROVE. For each commitment, COMMIT_GAS_RESERVATION (1,000,000 gas) is charged based on the maximum base fee possible in the next block, max_next_base_fee = base_fee + max(base_fee // 8, 1) (see EIP-1559). The transaction's intrinsic cost (FRAME_TX_INTRINSIC_COST from EIP-8141) and the calldata cost of the commitment hash are charged as usual, and the receipt records each commitment's index, gas payer address, and escrowed amount. In block N, the REVEAL frame executes with COMMIT_GAS_RESERVATION as its gas budget, gas is calculated at block N's actual base fee, and there is no priority fee. After execution, refund = escrowed_amount - (gas_used * block_N_base_fee) is refunded to the gas payer set in block N-1. Because the escrow was set at the maximum base fee, it always covers the actual fee. If there is no reveal, the escrowed funds are burned based on the max_next_base_fee at the time of escrow, and the commitment expires without any EVM execution or state change, becoming invalid in subsequent blocks.

Inclusion enforced via fork choice

Inclusion of REVEAL transactions follows the same model as inclusion list enforcement in EIP-7805 (FOCIL), enforced through fork choice by the ordinary attestation committee for that slot. During the first REVEAL_DEADLINE (2 seconds) of slot N, every validator observes the mempool and individually records which commitment indices received a valid reveal. At attestation time, each attester checks whether all reveals it observed before the deadline were included in block N, and if even one is missing, it must not attest to that block. This causes the block to lose fork-choice weight and become non-canonical, giving builders an incentive to include every reveal they have seen. If no block is produced in slot N, the commitment does not expire and must be included in a block in a later slot once a valid block appears, with the original REVEAL transaction remaining valid. This guarantees that revealing the payload is safe once block N-1 is finalized.

Shuffling and block validity rules

The execution order of revealed transactions is determined by RANDAO. The shuffle seed is independent of whether a commitment was included in block N-1 or its revealed content, so neither users nor builders can manipulate the execution order. At most MAX_COMMITS_PER_BLOCK (block_gas_limit // COMMIT_GAS_RESERVATION) COMMIT frames are allowed per block, ensuring all reveals fit within block N's gas limit. Block N must begin with a contiguous run of REVEAL transactions, with no other transaction allowed before or between them, and the reveals must be arranged in the random order determined by the shuffle. Every REVEAL frame must correspond to an existing, not-yet-consumed COMMIT hash. However, the RANDAO approach has the limitation that builders know the order as soon as RANDAO is generated, so the source mentions a shuffle committee (N randomly selected validators) that produces randomness verifiable only after REVEAL_DEADLINE as a stronger alternative.

Remaining attack vectors and accepted tradeoffs

This prevents targeted front-running but not all value extraction. 'Speculative front-running' remains possible, where an attacker places multiple front-running COMMITs in block N-1 and reveals only the profitable ones in block N, but this is substantially mitigated by a low MAX_COMMITS_PER_BLOCK, a high COMMIT_GAS_RESERVATION, and a more random shuffle. Back-running that targets arbitrage or liquidation opportunities arising after a reveal executes is an intrinsic property of blockchains and cannot be fully prevented; the source mentions a future mechanism of auctioning the position below REVEAL to the highest bidder (or highest burner) so the protocol captures that value. A user who commits can strategically decide during slot N-1 whether to reveal based on the situation, but since no one knows the payload in that case, this is argued not to be inherently unfair to other users. The gas payer of the VERIFY frame can expose sender information, which is mostly mitigated by using a well-known, widely used public contract with a large and diverse user base. The fixed 1,000,000 gas escrow is designed to hide the actual gas limit within the range [0, k * 1M].

Two-slot design and current status

Handling both commit and execution within the same slot would force builders to finalize transaction order before seeing execution results, allowing invalid transactions to occupy block space. Splitting it into two slots allows the reveal to be validated before inclusion. This appears to add inclusion latency, but in the optimal case a user can already be considered 'included' in block N-1, and the REVEAL payload executes ahead of any transaction created after block N-1. For compatibility, a paymaster sponsoring gas for the commit-reveal flow must explicitly support COMMIT transactions. This proposal is in Draft status, created on 2026-04-01, so its constants and specification may still change, and there is no record of a fork-inclusion decision at a core developer call.

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