EIP-8184 LUCID Encrypted Mempool
No call decision · Security & privacy · EIP status Draft · created 2026-03-04
Adds a 'commit first, reveal later' path that propagates MEV-sensitive transactions to the public mempool in encrypted form and only reveals their contents after block inclusion is finalized. No specific encryption scheme is fixed into the protocol.
Why it is needed
Transactions currently sitting in the public mempool can be viewed by anyone before they enter a block. As a result, profitable trades become targets for frontrunning or sandwich attacks, and to avoid this, users have come to rely on trusted intermediaries such as private relays or builder-only mempools. This has dried up the public mempool, entrenched the position of existing builders, and made block access vulnerable to outages, policy changes, and blacklisting. EIP-7805 (FOCIL), designed for censorship resistance, also requires transactions to be publicly propagated, so it cannot protect transactions exposed to MEV. Meanwhile, no single encryption scheme yet satisfies all the requirements for being hardcoded into the protocol (no trusted setup, small public keys, practical ciphertext size, CCA2 security, a path to quantum resistance, and so on). LUCID leaves the encryption scheme open while creating a path for encrypted transactions to be included through the public path.
What changes
Today
- Putting MEV-sensitive transactions into the public mempool exposes their contents, leading to frontrunning and sandwich attacks
- To get protection, users must first disclose transaction contents to a trusted intermediary such as a private relay
- FOCIL inclusion lists only give censorship resistance to transactions whose contents are public
After EIP-8184
- Transactions are propagated to the public mempool in encrypted form, and the key is revealed only after the block inclusion commitment is finalized
- After the commitment, builders cannot swap the ciphertext, reorder it, or insert new transactions
- Encrypted transactions are also carried in inclusion lists and receive censorship resistance
- It also supports self-decryption, so it is not tied to a specific encryption scheme or key publisher.
Who is affected
- Users: This creates an option to gain both MEV protection and censorship resistance without disclosing transaction content to a trusted intermediary beforehand.
- Wallet & app developers: Must support creating new ST ticket transactions, designating a key publisher, and the encryption and key release flow, and receive inclusion notifications via /eth/v2/events.
- Client teams: Must implement a new transaction type, extended bids and payloads, key message verification, and new Engine API endpoints.
- Builders / validators: Builders commit to the ST without knowing its content, and attesters and the PTC audit commitment omission and key timeliness to vote.
In depth
Sealed transactions and ST tickets
A sealed transaction (ST) consists of a signed ST ticket that goes on chain and a ciphertext_envelope that does not go on chain. It is SSZ-encoded when placed in an inclusion list and RLP-encoded as a new EIP-2718 type transaction for mempool propagation. The ST ticket is itself a new EIP-2718 type transaction: it is charged a fee and consumes the sender account's nonce, but is not executed as a normal EVM message call. In addition to the common fields, it has max_tob_fee, max_preceding_commitments, key_publisher, key_publication_fee_recipient, key_publication_fee, key_commitment, reveal_commitment, and ciphertext_hash fields. signature_id is 1 byte, and the only currently valid value is EC_DSA_TYPE == 0x01, a design choice meant to avoid locking the protocol into ECDSA signatures, which are not quantum resistant.
Ciphertext envelope and decryption conditions
The ciphertext_envelope consists of a header, which the protocol does not interpret, and dem_ciphertext. dem_ciphertext is the output of ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD encryption, where the key is the 32-byte k_dem, the nonce is keccak256(chain_id || ticket_from || ticket_nonce)[:12], the aad is empty, and the format is ciphertext || tag (16 bytes). The decrypted result, plaintext_tx, must be an EIP-1559 transaction and must satisfy max_priority_fee_per_gas = 0, max_fee_per_gas = 0, and gas_limit = ticket.gas_limit. The sender binds the key to the ticket via key_commitment = keccak256(k_dem) and binds the plaintext to be revealed via reveal_commitment = hash_tree_root(RevealCommitmentPreimage), while ciphertext_hash = keccak256(ciphertext_envelope) fixes the ciphertext bytes. Since gas_limit must cover the calldata cost of the SealedTransaction's byte size, EIP-7825 limits the size of the ST.
Bundles and key publishers
Only STs using the same key_publisher can be bundled together (up to MAX_STS_PER_BUNDLE = 64 per bundle), and that key_publisher signs to certify that it assembled the bundle. bundle_root is the keccak256 of the concatenated ticket hashes, and the key publisher signs (chain_id, bundle_root) with ECDSA. When a builder commits, the bundle carries an executable bitfield, where a ticket's bit is set to 1 if it can pay ticket_fee and passes the nonce check. The bundle's max_preceding_commitments is the minimum among the STs with executable = 1, and bundle_tob_fee is the sum of tob_fee across those STs. The initial design has no protocol mechanism for the key publisher to bear liability for failing to reveal, but a similar effect can be achieved outside the protocol by including a sponsor ST in the bundle that pledges a high max_tob_fee from the key publisher's own funds.
Bid extensions, ST-commitment ordering, and gas allocation
st_commitments and IL_roots are added to ExecutionPayloadBid. An STCommitment carries commitment_root (ticket_hash for a single ST, bundle_root for a bundle), commitment_key, gas_obligation, and executable. For a single ST, gas_obligation = ticket.gas_limit; for a bundle, it is the sum of gas_limit over the tickets with executable[i] == 1. Commitments follow the 'ST-commitment ordering rule': sorted in descending order of commitment_tob_fee, with ties broken by descending gas_obligation and then ascending commitment_root. The gas available to decrypted STs is capped at tob_gas_limit, which is 1/TOB_GAS_FRACTION_DENOMINATOR (= 1/8) of the block gas limit, and each inclusion list is capped at MAX_ST_COMMITS_PER_IL = 2 ST entries. When the encrypted mempool is used less, the unused allocation does not eat into regular transaction space.
Key release and timeliness voting
The key publisher looks at the ST-commitments in the beacon block, checks that its commitment's gas_obligation matches executable, that the total gas_obligation sum is within tob_gas_limit, and that the ordering matches max_preceding_commitments, and once it judges the block likely to settle (e.g. after observing attestations), it releases the list of k_dem values via an unsigned LucidKeyMessage. For a single ST, the sender may also release the key directly. A key message is valid only if it satisfies hash matching on commitment_key, chain_id matching, the presence of the corresponding commitment in the scheduling block, the key count and ordering rules, and the decryption success condition. The payload timeliness committee (PTC) votes on keys it observed on time via a keys_observed bitfield, and the next slot's PTC checks, using timely/late/equivocation aggregation conditions, whether the builder's judgment on key omission or inclusion was justified, voting against payload timeliness if it fails.
Fee charging and execution rules
The ST ticket is charged base_fee + key_publication_fee + priority_fee + tob_fee, where priority_fee and tob_fee are capped by max_fee. Plaintext that is successfully decrypted executes at the very front of the next block; since the fee was prepaid via the ticket, EIP-1559 fee cap validation is skipped and gas is not charged again. Calldata cost is computed based on max(len(ciphertext_envelope), len(plaintext_tx.data)) bytes, and unused gas plus (TOB_FEE_FRACTION - 1) / TOB_FEE_FRACTION (= 127/128) of the tob_fee are refunded, while key_publication_fee is paid to the designated recipient. The decrypted transaction executes against the header of the block in which the ticket was committed, preventing the builder from injecting information after seeing the content; EIP-7843's SLOTNUM returns the slot number in which the ticket was included, and the history updates for EIP-2935 and EIP-4788 are deferred until after the last ST execution.
Defense against probabilistic front-running
This addresses, with five layers of defense, 'probabilistic front-running,' where an attacker pre-commits several options, watches others reveal their keys, and only reveals its own key when advantageous. The plaintext, call data, and actual signer are hidden until commitment (the plaintext signer may differ from the ticket signer), no ciphertext substitution, reordering, or new insertion is possible after commitment, and execution is based on the block header at the time of commitment. Commitments are ordered by ToB fee, so merely holding a slot repeatedly costs tob_fee / TOB_FEE_FRACTION each time, and failing to reveal the key forfeits the entire tob_fee. Also, if the sender limits via max_preceding_commitments the number m of commitments that can precede it, then even if an attacker buys all m slots at a higher fee, at most 2^(m-1) execution patterns remain selectable. Bundles sum the ToB fees of the STs they contain, making the economics of such attacks even worse.
Progress status
This EIP is in Draft status, so the specification may still change. The source also discusses alternative specifications under consideration, such as a variant that completes decryption within the same slot, integration with EIP-8141 frame transactions, and a variant that achieves censorship resistance without FOCIL. No decision on fork inclusion has been made in core developer calls at this time.