EIP-8149 Multi KZG point evaluation precompile

No call decision · Scaling & data · EIP status Draft · created 2026-02-06

Adds the ability to verify multiple evaluation values (z, y) for a single blob commitment in one precompile call. The return value is the same as the existing point evaluation precompile.

Why it is needed

Ethereum introduced large data chunks called blobs in EIP-4844 and placed a point evaluation precompile at address 0x0A so smart contracts could verify specific values inside a blob. However, this precompile verifies only one value per call and costs 50,000 gas per call. Contracts that need to check multiple values in one blob, such as for fraud proofs, must pay this cost repeatedly for each value. This proposal aims to reduce that repeated cost by adding a new precompile that verifies multiple evaluations in a single call. It verifies k openings for one commitment at once, reducing both the number of calls and the overall burden.

What changes

Today

After EIP-8149

Who is affected

In depth

Input format

The input is concatenated in the order versioned_hash (Bytes32), commitment (Bytes48), n (big-endian uint32), n pairs of (z: Bytes32, y: Bytes32), and proof (Bytes48). The total length must be exactly 132 + (n x 64) bytes. Every z and y MUST be strictly less than BLS_MODULUS, and field elements that are not in canonical form are rejected. n must be between 1 and MAX_MULTI_POINTS (128). Since only one commitment is accepted, this precompile is intended for verifying multiple evaluations of the same blob.

Verification logic

Per the pseudocode, the precompile parses the input and performs three checks. First, it confirms the range of n, the input length, and that each z_i and y_i is less than BLS_MODULUS. Second, it confirms that kzg_to_versioned_hash(commitment) equals versioned_hash. Third, it verifies the multi-point opening proof with verify_kzg_proof_multi(commitment, z_values, y_values, proof). This function uses the same trusted setup as EIP-4844 and BLS12-381 pairing operations. Implementations typically construct a polynomial through all (z_i, y_i) via Lagrange interpolation, which has O(n squared) complexity, though this can be reduced to O(n log n) with FFT-based methods when the evaluation points align with roots of unity. The final verification confirms all openings simultaneously with a single pairing check.

Output format

On success, the return value is the same 64 bytes as EIP-4844's existing point evaluation precompile. The first 32 bytes contain FIELD_ELEMENTS_PER_BLOB and the last 32 bytes contain BLS_MODULUS, each as a big-endian uint256. Keeping the return format identical to the existing one means contracts that used 0x0A can migrate with almost no change to their result-handling logic. The original Rationale also cites preserving EIP-4844's versioned hash model and return format as a design reason.

Gas cost

Gas is calculated as MULTI_POINT_EVALUATION_BASE_GAS + MULTI_POINT_EVALUATION_PER_POINT_GAS x n. Both constants' values are still TBD. The original recommends (SHOULD) that these constants be set so that a batched call is cheaper than calling 0x0A separately n times when n is 2 or more. The BLS12-381 pairing operations used internally for verification are computationally expensive, but they allow multiple openings to be verified together efficiently. The Security Considerations section also states that gas pricing MUST reflect the actual computational cost.

Design choices

Rather than modifying the existing 0x0A precompile, a new precompile is added at a new address. This choice avoids compatibility risk. The new precompile's address (MULTI_POINT_EVALUATION_PRECOMPILE_ADDRESS) is still TBD. The cap on the number of evaluations, MAX_MULTI_POINTS, is set to 128, chosen to limit input size while still allowing meaningful cost savings. In terms of backwards compatibility, none of EIP-4844 transactions, the BLOBHASH opcode, or the existing 0x0A precompile are changed.

Security considerations

The original specifies three requirements. First, non-canonical field elements greater than or equal to BLS_MODULUS must be rejected. Second, implementations MUST use the same trusted setup and subgroup checks as EIP-4844. Third, gas pricing MUST reflect the actual computational cost. Keeping the trusted setup and subgroup checks identical to the existing ones is a condition for ensuring the two precompiles' verification results do not diverge.

Progress status

This proposal is currently in Draft status. Details remain unfinalized, including both the precompile address and the two gas constants, which are still TBD, and the specification may change during discussion. No decision has been made so far at a core developer call to include it in any specific fork.

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