EIP-8046 Uniform Price Inclusion List auction (UPIL) (Uniform price auction over inclusion lists)

No call decision · Fees & gas · EIP status Draft · created 2025-10-16

Introduces a uniform price auction so that inclusion list transactions offering a higher fee are not pushed out even when a block is full. Every included transaction pays the same marginal ranking fee, and this fee is burned.

Why it is needed

Censorship resistance is a core property of a decentralized blockchain. EIP-7805 (FOCIL) has a role called the includer propagate inclusion lists (ILs) and has witnesses check via fork choice whether the transactions in that list made it into the block, so that a builder constructing the block cannot leave out specific transactions. However, FOCIL has no mechanism for ranking transactions within an IL, so once a block is full, censorship resistance cannot be upheld. A builder can fill the block with fake transactions and ignore the IL. This problem is even bigger in multidimensional fee markets that price each resource separately, since filling just one resource is enough to make the block count as full, and the cost of doing so can be very low. For time-sensitive transactions that must land within a few blocks, even a few blocks of delay can be fatal. This EIP adds an auction that ranks transactions by how much they are willing to pay above the base fee, ensuring that a higher-bidding IL transaction must be included even when the block is full.

What changes

Today

After EIP-8046

Who is affected

In depth

Calculating the ranking fee

Ranking is performed using ranking_fee_per_gas, which is get_max_fee_per_gas(tx) minus block.base_fee_per_gas. In other words, the entire margin a transaction leaves above the base fee is used for ranking. Legacy transactions use gas_price, frame transactions use fees.max_fee_per_gas, and others use max_fee_per_gas. The ranking fee determines only whether the transaction is included in the block and places no constraint on execution order within the block. The source text also discusses an alternative specification in which frame transactions get a dedicated field, max_ranking_fee_per_gas, to set a separate cap on the ranking fee.

Post-execution batch settlement

The builder specifies marginal_ranking_fee_per_gas in the block body, and every transaction pays an inclusion_fee_per_gas of base_fee_per_gas + marginal_ranking_fee_per_gas before its priority fee. A valid transaction must satisfy max_fee_per_gas >= inclusion_fee_per_gas. Because the marginal ranking fee is determined by the execution outcome, execution must not depend on that value. So during execution, each transaction is charged based on max_fee_per_gas rather than effective_gas_price, unused gas is refunded, and the priority fee is not yet paid to the block author. After all execution finishes, priority_fee_per_gas is computed as min(max_priority_fee_per_gas, max_fee_per_gas - inclusion_fee_per_gas), the difference is refunded to the signer, and only the priority fee is paid to block.author. The inclusion fee is not distributed to anyone and is burned. The GASPRICE opcode still returns the effective_gas_price defined by EIP-1559. If execution could observe the marginal fee, it would open an attack that makes any fee value inconsistent, so settlement happens after the auction concludes, as with a uniform price auction.

The altered FOCIL inclusion check

EIP-7805's post-execution inclusion check changes into three steps. (1) If IL transaction T is already in the block, is not willing to pay the inclusion fee (get_ranking_fee_per_gas(T, B) < marginal_ranking_fee_per_gas), or fails static validity, move on to the next IL transaction. A frame transaction passes only if it is a Profile 2 candidate allowed by EIP-8369's per-IL VERIFY budget. (2) For each gas dimension in EIP-8037, compute gas_ranked_left(T) by subtracting from B.gas_limit the gas occupied by transactions ranked equal to or higher than T, and move on if T's reserved gas exceeds this in any dimension. A normal transaction reserves min(TX_MAX_GAS_LIMIT, tx.gas) of execution gas and tx.gas of state gas. (3a) A normal transaction is validated against the nonce and balance at the start of the block, reflecting all changes from equal- or higher-ranked transactions and only the balance decreases from lower-ranked transactions. Balance increases from lower-ranked transactions are ignored, so no circular dependency arises. (3b) A frame transaction is validated against the state at the index claimed by the builder. If T is valid, the block is rejected with an INCLUSION_LIST_UNSATISFIED error.

Verifying the marginal ranking fee

An IL transaction that had no room in step (2) is still validated via (3a) or (3b), but in that case lower-ranked transactions are not reflected at all. This is to prevent a builder from lowering the marginal fee by including a lower-ranked transaction that invalidates the IL transaction that would otherwise set the fee. If valid, its ranking fee is recorded, and a transaction that reserves more than TX_MAX_GAS_LIMIT (2**24) of state gas is excluded from the record. Such transactions are protected like under FOCIL if there is room, but cannot determine the fee. marginal_ranking_fee_per_gas must equal the highest recorded ranking fee, or 0 if no record exists.

How censorship cost changes

The source text models and compares censorship cost as the sum of the dummy transaction's gas cost, the ranking fee, and the forgone MEV. In a multidimensional fee market, FOCIL can drive the cost close to zero by filling just the cheapest resource, but under UPIL the censor must pay the censorship target's ranking fee across the entire dummy gas amount. To censor a transaction using 100k gas in a resource with a 60M gas limit, the censor must pay (60-0.1)/0.1 = 599 times the amount the censored party was willing to pay. The censored party does not actually pay the high fee it offered; after censorship ends it only pays that block's marginal ranking fee. Even under the current single base-fee market, FOCIL censorship can be cheap for the first few blocks, but under UPIL the cost can balloon to thousands of times from the very first block. A strategy of filling blocks with slow transactions gathered from private order flow is also ineffective under UPIL because of the ranking fee and opportunity cost.

The basis for the uniform price auction and burning

In a uniform price auction, everyone reveals their willingness to pay, but in practice everyone pays the same minimum fee. If the base fee prices congestion between blocks, the marginal ranking fee is a secondary base fee that prices competition for a slot within a block. After a full block, the base fee rises by 12.5%, so most transactions are effectively already bidding that much in ranking fee. The reason fees are burned rather than given to includers is to remove the incentive for includers to deliberately withhold transactions and release them all in one block to create congestion and drive up fees. That said, the source also examines, as alternatives to rewarding includers, three funding sources (a dedicated includer fee, redistribution of priority fees, and distribution of the marginal ranking fee), four distribution methods (keyed, individual, seniority-based, and collective distribution), and a pay-as-you-bid variant where bidders simply pay their bid amount.

Backwards compatibility and caveats

For EIP-1559, EIP-4844, and EIP-8141 format transactions, the entire max_fee_per_gas can be used to cover the marginal_ranking_fee_per_gas in a congested block. A user who set max_fee_per_gas at twice the base fee and paid almost no priority fee may be surprised to see the full amount consumed in the next block, but they will never pay more than the max_fee_per_gas they originally approved. Because the charge is held against max_fee_per_gas until the end of the block, the balance available to subsequent transactions in the same block is lower than under EIP-1559, and the coinbase also receives the priority fee only at the end of the block. In blocks where the marginal ranking fee is positive, GASPRICE can come out lower than the price actually paid, leaving room for contracts that refund gas based on GASPRICE to under-pay.

Current status

This EIP is in Draft status as of October 16, 2025, and both the specification and the alternative designs may still change. It is defined on top of FOCIL (EIP-7805) and assumes EIP-8037, EIP-8141, and EIP-8369. The call notes provided do not contain a fork-inclusion decision for this EIP.

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