EIP-8045 Excluding slashed validators from block proposal (Exclude Slashed Validators from Proposing)

No call decision · Consensus & staking · EIP status Last Call · created 2025-10-16

A change that removes validators who have been penalized (slashed) from the block proposer lottery entirely. It keeps the chain running normally without empty slots even when mass slashing occurs.

Why it is needed

On Ethereum, validators that have been penalized (slashed) for breaking the rules have their blocks rejected by the network even if they produce them. Yet currently such validators can still be selected as block proposers. When selected, the block is invalidated, so that slot simply ends up empty. Normally slashing is rare, so this is not a big problem, but it becomes a different story when an incident causes many validators to be slashed at once. Empty slots repeat for the long period until all slashed validators have fully exited, degrading chain performance. If mass slashing coincides with a network failure, the empty slots could make recovery work considerably harder. This EIP reduces this disruption by filtering out slashed validators at the proposer selection stage.

What changes

Today

After EIP-8045

Who is affected

In depth

Modification of get_beacon_proposer_indices

The get_beacon_proposer_indices function in the consensus spec changes. It narrows the candidate set from all active validators to validators that are active and not slashed. Specifically, among the results of get_active_validator_indices(state, epoch), only the indices where state.validators[i].slashed is false are collected, then passed to compute_proposer_indices together with the seed obtained from get_seed(state, epoch, DOMAIN_BEACON_PROPOSER) to return the epoch's Vector[ValidatorIndex, SLOTS_PER_EPOCH]. The selection algorithm itself is unchanged; only the candidate filter is added.

Why it is safe to exclude them

A slashed validator is already blocked from proposing blocks at the state transition validation stage. The process_block function checks that the proposer is not slashed and treats a block from a slashed proposer as invalid. So selecting a slashed validator as proposer accomplishes nothing and just leaves the slot empty. The source text characterizes these validators as untrustworthy participants (malicious or faulty) and explains that removing them at the selection stage ahead of time is a natural cleanup.

Design choice: upfront filtering

Two designs are possible. One filters out slashed validators from the candidate pool before the shuffle computation; the other keeps all active validators as candidates, lets the shuffle draw indices, and then filters out slashed validators afterward. The two approaches do not produce exactly identical selection results, but both achieve the same goal of drawing balance-weighted selections from the set of active, non-slashed validators. Complexity is low either way, and this EIP chose upfront filtering.

Why EIP-7917 is a prerequisite

Historically, slashed validators were kept in the proposer candidate pool for the sake of selection-mechanism stability. Excluding them meant that every time the chain processed a slashing, the future proposer order would shift entirely, even within the lookahead window. EIP-7917 fixes proposer selection in advance and stores it in the beacon state, so slashings processed afterward no longer affect an order that has already been set. This precondition is what makes excluding slashed validators safe. That is why this EIP lists EIP-7917 as a requirement.

Selection distribution and the effect of mass slashing

This change has no effect on the randomness or fairness among validators that are not slashed. The selection algorithm is identical; the only difference is that slashed validators are removed from the candidate pool. In a mass-slashing scenario, this is a pure benefit. Instead of many slashed validators being selected as proposers and leaving a large number of slots empty, only non-slashed validators are selected, so the network keeps operating normally.

Backward compatibility and testing requirements

This is a backward-incompatible change to the consensus rules, so it MUST be activated as part of a scheduled network upgrade. Testing must confirm three things: that a slashed validator is never selected as proposer, that a complete proposer_lookahead is generated even when slashed validators exist, and that slashing does not affect an existing proposer_lookahead.

Current status

This EIP is in Last Call status, with a last-call-deadline of 2026-11-01. Last Call is the final review stage before finalization, and the content may be adjusted based on feedback received during this period. There is no record provided of a core developer call decision to include it in a specific fork.

Original EIP · ← EIPs