EIP-7940 Ethereum Shah Election Proposal (Ethereum Shah)
No call decision · Other · EIP status Draft · created 2025-04-28
A proposal for the Ethereum community to elect a guardian called the 'Shah' and entrust them with EIP inclusion roadmap decisions and veto power. It is an Informational proposal that does not change protocol code.
Why it is needed
In Ethereum, decisions to change protocol rules are made by consensus among core developers in a meeting called All Core Devs (ACD). The proposer diagnoses that coordination between the community and core developers has recently broken down in this process. The representative example cited is EOF, which changes the EVM code format. It was developed for years but was ultimately rejected due to community opposition, and the causes cited are the communication fragmentation between researchers/core developers and the ecosystem (even supporters were unaware of the toolchain update burden across the broader ecosystem), and a lack of compatibility testing that exposed protocol-level risks. The proposal starts from the premise that, to reduce the inefficiency of a proposal being rejected at the last minute after years of labor under committee-style consensus, an elected guardian is needed to manage the roadmap and EIPs on behalf of the community.
What changes
Today
- EIP inclusion is decided by committee-style consensus, which can lead to proposals like EOF being rejected at the last minute after years of development
- The interests of holders, stakers, app developers, and other community members are not conveyed to core developers in a timely manner
- Only individual proposals (what to do) are discussed, leaving a vacancy in the role of tending to the higher-level roadmap (why to do it)
After EIP-7940
- The elected Shah unilaterally decides the EIP inclusion roadmap and exercises veto power
- The Shah maintains communication channels with the community, acts as coordinator for ACD calls, and reports progress quarterly
- The Shah relies solely on the community's trust with no official authority, and the term expiration date is set at the time of election
Who is affected
- Core developers and client teams: EIP roadmap decisions pass to the Shah, and the way ACD calls are run and proposals are screened changes
- Holders, stakers, app developers, and businesses: They convey their opinions through communication channels maintained by the Shah and are asked for feedback on EIPs
- Ethereum Foundation (EF): The Shah does not report to the Foundation, and compensation is paid not by the Foundation but by the Protocol Guild
- Protocol Guild: The entity that directly pays the Shah's compensation from funds contributed by the community
In depth
Election method
The Shah SHOULD be elected by the Ethereum community. Selection combines ETH voting, social signalling, and core dev ratification. Every clause in this document is written with SHOULD and SHOULD NOT rather than MUST, and these keywords are interpreted per RFC 2119 and RFC 8174. In other words, it is not a binding rule but a document presenting a recommended social consensus framework.
The Shah's role and authority
The Shah bears sole responsibility for deciding the EIP inclusion roadmap and must have veto power over which EIPs are included. They also have a duty to maintain communication channels with the community, including holders, stakers, app developers, and businesses, to understand their needs and solicit feedback on EIPs. On ACD calls they act as coordinator and must submit quarterly progress reports to stakeholders. They must also explicitly point out blockers and communication breakdowns, and if a core developer is obstructing problem resolution, must point that out publicly as well.
Limits of authority and source of compensation
The Shah SHOULD NOT hold any special privileges. For example, they cannot fire a developer at an organization outside their control. They also must not report to the Ethereum Foundation, and compensation is paid directly from the Protocol Guild, the most reliable 'Ethereum' funding source that has received budget contributions from various community members. The Rationale explains that the Shah's authority is primarily social, with no official power whatsoever, and that its force derives solely from the community's belief in the Shah's power. The proposer argues that this is sufficient in the context of leading ACD calls and the EIP roadmap.
Term, resignation, removal
The Shah's term expiration date must be set at the time of election. The original specification text states the term 'does exceed 2 years', but the clause immediately following it and the Security Considerations presuppose a '2 year term', and the Shah should be able to voluntarily step down before the 2-year term ends. The obvious security risk is a case where the Shah actually rejects an EIP that aligns with community interests, or prioritizes one that does not. In this case, the solution is for the community to publicly voice opposition and remove the Shah, and the proposer expects that core developers will already start ignoring the Shah's opinion even before formal removal. The document states that a minimum term of 6 months is appropriate so that at least two quarterly reports are produced, and that removal requires at least the same level of community consensus as election.
The background EOF case and its rationale
The Motivation cites the EOF situation as an example of coordination failure. The causes cited for the rejection of EOF, after years of development, are communication fragmentation and a lack of rigorous compatibility testing. The Rationale presents as models the 'Imperator' temporarily elected by the Roman Senate in wartime, and the pluralist tradition of the Persian Empire, which respected cultural and religious diversity. This proposal is heavily inspired by Greg the Greek's writing that 'there is no strong leader to say NO to an EIP,' and current hard fork coordinator Tim Beiko has also pointed out that the piece most conspicuously missing from the ACD process is setting the higher-level roadmap. Proposer Ameen Soleimani also cites his own experience blocking ProgPow as grounds. Even in his position as MolochDAO's summoner, core developers did not believe he sufficiently represented the community, and persuasion was only completed once several people, including Martin Koeppelmann, stepped in. The argument is that the Shah is a device that shortens such suspicion by establishing a baseline understanding of 'representing the community's will.'
Document nature and current status
This document is of the Informational type, so it does not change protocol rules or client implementations and is a write-up containing a proposal on governance structure. Its current status is Draft, meaning the content may change or be withdrawn going forward. It is not a hard fork inclusion target, so there is no decision on inclusion to be made on core developer calls.