EIP-7848 On-chain upgrade signaling
No call decision · Networking & nodes · EIP status Draft · created 2024-12-22
Adds a reference implementation hash field to the block header so that a network upgrade is activated only once enough blocks have signaled an intent to run the new software.
Why it is needed
Right now, Ethereum mainnet upgrades are announced via a blog post on ethereum.org. There is no procedure to confirm on-chain whether network participants are actually ready. The source document points to the situation since the Merge (the transition to proof of stake). Validators have valuable assets staked, so a rational validator only chooses to upgrade when it expects most other participants to upgrade as well. If it looks like 95% or more will go along, a validator follows; if 5% or less will, it does not; and in the middle range, it can be rational to accept a small penalty and shut down the node rather than risk slashing and losing all staked ether by participating in the wrong network. The source document therefore says that forking mainnet has become effectively impossible, and that managing upgrades based on consensus has become important. This proposal tries to confirm that consensus on-chain by having block production signal approval and turning on the upgrade only once it clears a set threshold.
What changes
Today
- Upgrades are announced via a blog post on ethereum.org
- There is no way to confirm on-chain whether participants agree to the new software
- EIP-2124 only tells nodes each other's software versions and cannot signal readiness before an upgrade
After EIP-7848
- A referenceImplementationHash field is placed right after extraData in the block header
- Participants who support the upgrade run the new software and cast an approval vote by including that hash in their blocks
- If the number of approving blocks exceeds the threshold at the block where the voting window ends, the new behavior takes effect starting with the next block
- If the threshold is not met, the upgrade fails and the existing behavior is retained
Who is affected
- Validators: Including referenceImplementationHash when producing a block becomes a direct way to signal approval or disapproval of the upgrade. An upgrade with less than 100% participation can harm validators who did not participate.
- Consensus client teams: A new field must be added to the block header, and the voting window and threshold parameters must be implemented in clients. The new client must behave exactly like the existing network until the upgrade is activated.
- Upgrade proposer: When submitting a hard fork EIP, the proposer must also specify a public, feature-complete reference implementation along with the voting window and threshold.
- Ordinary users: Upgrades are no longer decided by announcement alone; whether to proceed can be confirmed by on-chain evidence, namely the approval ratio among block producers.
In depth
The referenceImplementationHash field
Consensus clients place the referenceImplementationHash field right after the extraData field in the block header. This value is the SHA-256 hash of the reference implementation source code for the proposed upgrade, packaged as a tar archive. The upgrade proposer must designate a public, feature-complete reference implementation, and consensus clients identify themselves through a reference implementation that behaves equivalently to it. A newly proposed client must behave identically to the existing network until the upgrade is activated, and the new behavior takes effect only once activated.
The four voting parameters
A hard fork EIP must specify four parameters, which are implemented in the consensus client. VOTING_WINDOW_BEGIN is the first block (inclusive) at which votes start being counted, VOTING_WINDOW_END is the last block (inclusive), REFERENCE_IMPLEMENTATION_HASH is the hash defined above, and REQUIRED_APPROVALS is the minimum number of approvals needed for activation. The length of the voting window (VOTING_WINDOW_END - VOTING_WINDOW_BEGIN) must be strictly greater than 14400 (about 2 days) and must be set to give participants enough time to be informed about the upgrade. The required number of approvals must strictly exceed 50% of the blocks in the voting window, and the source document recommends a higher threshold such as 95% or more.
Activation determination and fork branching
At the time the VOTING_WINDOW_END block is produced, if the number of blocks that set referenceImplementationHash to REFERENCE_IMPLEMENTATION_HASH during the voting window is at or above REQUIRED_APPROVALS, the upgrade is activated; otherwise it fails. Blocks after VOTING_WINDOW_END + 1 are produced with the new behavior only if the upgrade was activated. In networks such as proof-of-work networks, it is possible for one fork to be activated while another is not; in that case, each block must be produced based on the voting outcome recorded in its ancestor blocks. The source document adds that activation does not necessarily mean an immediate difference in how blocks are produced. The new behavior could be set to change block production only from a later point in time, or it could be some other consensus change that leaves block production itself unchanged.
Participants' verification responsibility
Network participants must study the reference implementation themselves to decide whether to support the upgrade. They must also verify that the software they will actually run faithfully implements behavior matching that reference implementation. The Security Considerations make the same point: since the four voting parameters are embedded within the reference implementation, participants must check for themselves whether they understand the actual software behavior.
Rationale: forking has become effectively impossible since the Merge
The source document's Rationale argues that forking mainnet has become effectively impossible since the Merge. Because validators have valuable assets staked, it is rational to upgrade only when widespread adoption is expected. If 95% or more participation is expected, validators upgrade; if 5% or less, they do not; and in the middle range there is a threshold at which it becomes rational to accept a small penalty and shut down a node rather than risk having 100% of staked ether (currently 16 ether per validator) slashed for participating in the wrong network. This is why consensus-based upgrade management matters. The source document also argues that although Ethereum has no official mission, the community will want to keep mainnet a community-led project, and on-chain signaling enables a kind of community leadership that is currently impossible.
Trademark issues and the limits of EIP-2124
The Backwards Compatibility section raises two points. First, the Ethereum Foundation (Stiftung Ethereum, based in Zug, Switzerland) holds the 'Ethereum' trademark, so if someone publishes a proposed mainnet consensus client, the Foundation may have the right to restrict that software from being promoted as an 'Ethereum' client. This carries its own securities-regulation risk as well. Second, EIP-2124 is a mechanism for nodes to announce software versions to each other, but it cannot signal readiness before an upgrade and does not specify which software an upgrade moves to.
Security considerations
An upgrade with less than 100% participation harms validators who did not participate. Overlapping or competing upgrades must be managed carefully, since multiple networks could cross the minimum threshold at the same time. Setting the voting period too long can delay or obstruct subsequent upgrade proposals.
Current status: Draft
This EIP is in Draft status. Details such as the field position in the specification, the minimum voting window length, and the recommended threshold may change during discussion. The core developer call records provided contain no decision to include this EIP in a fork.