EIP-7547 Inclusion list (Inclusion lists)

No call decision · Consensus & staking · EIP status Stagnant · created 2023-10-24

A consensus-layer mechanism that forces transactions designated by the slot N proposer to be included in the next block (slot N+1), even if the builder drops them from the block.

Why it is needed

As of October 2023, about 95% of Ethereum blocks are built not by validators but by specialized builders. Under the proposer-builder separation (PBS) structure, builders compete to produce blocks that extract the most MEV and hand them to proposers via mev-boost, with the builder deciding which transactions go in and which are left out. If the proposer builds the block directly, they can control inclusion but must forgo MEV rewards, creating a structural risk that certain transactions get persistently excluded. This EIP lets the proposer designate a list of transactions that must be forcibly included not in their own slot but in the immediately following slot, making it hard for the builder to refuse while not blocking the builder's block production itself, as a middle-ground solution.

What changes

Today

After EIP-7547

Who is affected

In depth

Key objects and constants

New containers are added: InclusionListSummaryEntry(address, gas_limit), InclusionListSummary(slot, proposer_index, list of summaries), SignedInclusionListSummary, and InclusionList(summary, transactions). The limits are MAX_TRANSACTIONS_PER_INCLUSION_LIST=2**4 (16), MAX_GAS_PER_INCLUSION_LIST=2**21, and the threshold for skipping sync checks is MIN_SLOTS_FOR_INCLUSION_LIST_REQUEST=1. ExecutionPayload and ExecutionPayloadHeader gain inclusion_list_summary and inclusion_list_exclusions fields (the header holds the root), and BeaconBlockBody caches inclusion_list_summary.

Slot N: proposal and validation

The slot N proposer broadcasts an inclusion list for slot N+1 along with the signed block. The summary contains only the transaction's source address and gas limit; the transactions themselves are not signed, but the summary is signed. If a validator does not see at least one inclusion list, it does not treat the block as subject to validation or fork choice. Transactions in the list must be executable as of the start of slot N, and are valid only if maxFeePerGas is at least 12.5% higher than the current slot.

Slot N+1: summary satisfaction check

The slot N+1 proposer builds a block along with the slot N proposer's signed summary. The payload contains the list of transaction indices from the slot N payload that satisfy each entry of the summary. The block is valid only if it meets both the execution condition, that it satisfies the summary and is executable from the execution layer's perspective, and the consensus condition, that the previous block proposer's signature is correct.

Why a separate gas limit was set

Whether to give the inclusion list its own gas limit or use the block gas limit as is was a design point of contention. A separate limit is simple but could create a side effect where, when the block is full, the proposer auctions off inclusion list slots as side payments. The alternative of folding it into the block gas limit has the problem that the next slot's proposer could deliberately fill the block to ignore the inclusion list. This EIP chose the former, a separate fixed gas limit (MAX_GAS_PER_INCLUSION_LIST).

The duplicate inclusion problem: the exclusion field

In an mev-boost environment, the proposer does not know in advance the content of the block it will propose, so a transaction in the slot N inclusion list can end up already processed in that same slot's ExecutionPayload. Forcing it again in slot N+1 would be a redundant requirement, so the payload's inclusion_list_exclusions field records transactions already processed, removing that transaction from the inclusion list summary.

Impact on mev-boost, builders, and relays

The mev-boost architecture itself does not change significantly, but as with any other hard fork, mev-boost, relays, and builders must adjust for the fork. Builders need to know that an execution payload that does not satisfy the inclusion list summary becomes invalid, and relays may take on an additional role of verifying this constraint before signing. When a validator receives a header, it can check whether inclusion_list_summary_root matches its own local version, and use its local block instead of the builder's block if there is a mismatch.

Skipping inclusion list checks during sync

For a node syncing to the latest head to consider a block valid, it would also need that block's inclusion list, but requiring this all the way back through past blocks would block syncing. The MIN_SLOTS_FOR_INCLUSION_LIST_REQUEST parameter is introduced so that if the block's slot plus this value is lower than the current slot, the inclusion list check can be skipped. This is the same approach as EIP-4844 skipping blob sidecar data availability checks outside the retention period.

Current status and remaining risks

This EIP's status is Stagnant, and there is no record of a fork inclusion decision in the call notes. The Security Considerations note that if a slot N proposer's inclusion list reduces the slot N+1 proposer's reward, the slot N+1 proposer could bribe the slot N proposer into submitting an empty list. This does not directly attack the protocol, but it is a profit-sharing commitment game that effectively neutralizes the inclusion list, and it is noted as remaining an active research topic that could occur regardless of which censorship resistance method is used.

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