EIP-6988 Excluding slashed validators from proposer selection (Elected block proposer has not been slashed)
No call decision · Consensus & staking · EIP status Stagnant · created 2023-05-04
Fixes the consensus layer logic so that a validator that has already been slashed cannot be selected when choosing a block proposer.
Why it is needed
Currently, two functions in the consensus layer code are out of sync. The compute_proposer_index function, which selects the proposer, can select a slashed validator as a candidate, while the process_block_header function, which validates blocks, unconditionally rejects a block produced by a slashed validator. As a result, when a slashed validator is selected as proposer, that slot simply passes with no block. If only a single validator is slashed, the impact is minor, but the problem grows when correlated slashing - where multiple validators are slashed at the same time - occurs. For example, if one-tenth of all validators are slashed at once, roughly one-tenth of all proposals could end up missing across several subsequent epochs.
What changes
Today
- Slashed validators are included among proposer selection candidates
- If a slashed validator is selected, the block for that slot is rejected at the validation stage
- As a result, that slot ends up empty with no proposer (missed proposal)
- If multiple validators are slashed at the same time, empty slots accumulate across several epochs
After EIP-6988
- Slashed validators are excluded from proposer selection candidates
- The proposer selection function (get_beacon_proposer_index) is fixed to return a correct proposer index even in blocks that are processing a slashing
- Even when correlated slashing occurs, the resulting empty slots are reduced
Who is affected
- Validators: Because a validator is removed from proposer candidacy the moment it is slashed, it reduces situations where that validator or others miss a proposal because of slashing.
- Client teams: Consensus layer implementations such as compute_proposer_index and get_beacon_proposer_index must be updated to match via a hard fork.
- The whole network: Even if a correlated slashing incident occurs, the side effect of growing empty slots is reduced, keeping block production more stable.
In depth
Contradiction in the existing logic
phase0/compute_proposer_index selects a proposer without checking slashing status, while phase0/process_block_header rejects a block produced by a slashed validator during validation. Because the two functions operate on different assumptions, the moment a slashed validator is selected as proposer, that slot is automatically left empty. This EIP aims to eliminate this contradiction.
The difference between isolated slashing and correlated slashing
On mainnet, the impact when a single validator is slashed is negligible. But in the case of correlated slashing, where multiple validators are slashed at the same time, the impact grows larger. As an example, the original text explains that if one tenth of the entire validator set is slashed in a correlated event, one tenth of all proposals could be missed across subsequent epochs.
Modifying get_beacon_proposer_index
The proposed change modifies the get_beacon_proposer_index function so that, when the slot of the latest block header equals state.slot, it reads the proposer index from the beacon state instead. This way, even if a block's proposer is slashed during the processing of that very block, the function still returns the correct proposer index. The detailed specification is in _features/eip6988/beacon-chain.md in the consensus-specs repository.
Deployed via hard fork
This change alters the proposer selection method in a backward-incompatible way, so a hard fork is required to apply it network-wide.
Test cases
The original text specifies four tests to verify the change: a test where a slashed proposer is rewarded for sync aggregate inclusion, a test where a slashed proposer is rewarded for attestation inclusion, a test confirming that a slashed validator is not selected as proposer (for eip6988), and a test under the existing phase0 spec confirming that a slashed validator is selected as proposer.
Security and current status
The original text states that this change introduces no new security issues. However, this EIP's current status is Stagnant, meaning it is not being actively discussed or confirmed for inclusion in a fork.