EIP-6914 Reuse of fully withdrawn validator indices (Reuse Withdrawn Validator Indices)
No call decision · Consensus & staking · EIP status Stagnant · created 2023-04-19
A proposal to reuse validator indices that have been fully withdrawn and have passed a certain waiting period for new deposits, preventing the beacon chain's validator list and balance list from growing indefinitely.
Why it is needed
The beacon chain has a validators list and a balances list, and every time a new deposit comes in, an entry is simply appended to the end of these lists. Even when a validator is fully withdrawn, its index remains empty and is never reused. Because Ethereum is a system where validators keep entering and exiting over a long period, this approach causes both lists to grow without bound. As state size grows, so does the data clients must hold in memory, the burden of computing the state root, and the work of scanning the entire validator set. This EIP aims to eliminate this unbounded growth problem by reusing indices that are fully withdrawn and have passed enough time to be considered safe.
What changes
Today
- Whenever a new validator deposit comes in, a new index is always appended to the end of the list.
- The index of a fully withdrawn validator remains empty permanently.
- As validators repeatedly enter and exit, the validators and balances lists grow without bound.
After EIP-6914
- Indices that have been fully withdrawn and have passed SAFE_EPOCHS_TO_REUSE_INDEX are reused for new deposits.
- The size of the validators and balances lists no longer grows indefinitely.
- A safety waiting period is placed before an index is reused, to prevent attacks.
Who is affected
- Client teams: The memory burden, state root computation cost, and validator scanning cost caused by the growth of the validator list size are reduced.
- Validators (stakers): Validators must be aware that their own validator index is not a permanent identifier and may later be reused for a different validator.
- Consensus layer implementations: The validator index reuse logic and safety waiting period calculation must be reflected in the state transition code.
- Execution layer (EL): This EIP requires no execution layer changes, so there is no impact.
In depth
Reuse conditions
This EIP allows an index to be reused only once a validator has been fully withdrawn and, after becoming eligible for withdrawal, a sufficient safety period has passed. Both conditions must be satisfied, and the specific configuration values and behavior are defined in the EIP-6914 feature branch of the consensus layer specs repository. No changes are required at the execution layer.
The root of the problem: append-only lists
The beacon chain's validators list and balances list only ever grow by appending an entry each time a deposit for a new pubkey arrives. If validators repeatedly join and leave over a long period, both lists grow without bound. This growth in state size adds burden in multiple places: client memory usage, state root computation, and validator set scanning. This EIP is introduced as a relatively simple improvement that prunes these lists during state transition.
Backward compatibility
This change is a backward-incompatible change to the consensus layer and must be scheduled as a hard fork. There is no compatibility issue for the execution layer.
Attack scenario: attestation poisoning
Reusing an index overwrites a previous validator's pubkey in the beacon state. However, AttesterSlashing reconstructs signing participants by validator index. Consider a hypothetical 1/3 attacker who voluntarily exits a small number N of validators on the honest chain, waits for those indices to be overwritten by new deposits, and then attempts to double-sign with the original N keys on an attack chain that forked before the exit. If N is set large enough that every committee on the attack chain contains, on average, one of the N keys, the aggregate attestation containing this double signature can be published but can no longer be submitted as an AttesterSlashing on the honest chain, since the indices now point to different pubkeys - breaking accountable safety.
Mitigation: SAFE_EPOCHS_TO_REUSE_INDEX
The index of an exited validator is not overwritten for SAFE_EPOCHS_TO_REUSE_INDEX epochs. This value is set to three times the weak subjectivity period, ensuring that within the security window where accountable safety is guaranteed, the double signature usable for an attack cannot be poisoned.
Why the alternative was not adopted
If AttesterSlashing carried a list of pubkeys instead of validator indices, this issue would not arise at all. However, this was not adopted because it requires a larger structural change and would increase the data requirements of AttesterSlashing - already the largest data type in the consensus layer - sixfold.
Current status
This EIP is in Stagnant status, and its test cases are still work-in-progress within the consensus layer standard test suite. There is no record that fork inclusion has been decided, and specification details and adoption may still change.