EIP-3756 Gas limit cap
No call decision · Fees & gas · EIP status Stagnant · created 2021-08-21
A proposal to set a protocol-level cap of 30 million on the block gas limit, which block producers could previously raise arbitrarily.
Why it is needed
Currently, the gas limit can be set however the block producer likes. A higher gas limit causes state and blockchain history to grow faster than nodes can handle, increasing the operational burden, and in a malicious case, amplifying the damage of certain DoS attacks. The decision to raise the gas limit is an important matter that affects network security and decentralization, but under the current structure a single block producer's judgment can bypass this without an EIP or All Core Devs discussion.
What changes
Today
- Block producers can freely raise the gas limit as much as they want
- A gas limit increase can happen without core developer consensus or the EIP process
After EIP-3756
- After fork block N, any block with a gas_limit above 30,000,000 is treated as invalid
- Block producers can still freely lower the gas limit below 30,000,000
Who is affected
- Validators and block producers: The gas limit can no longer be set above 30 million, while the freedom to lower it in the event of network instability is preserved.
- Client teams: A gas limit cap check must be added to block validation logic.
- Users and app developers: The amount of transactions a block can process is constrained below this cap.
In depth
Specification: how the cap is applied
From fork block N onward, any block with a gas_limit above 30,000,000 is considered invalid. In other words, the cap is hardcoded into the block validation rules at the protocol level.
Rationale: why cap the limit
The gas limit is currently fully controlled by the current block producer (proposer). They can raise it to whatever value they want, which allows protocol decisions that could negatively affect network security or decentralization to bypass the EIP and All Core Devs process.
Rationale: a cap, not a fixed limit
Only an upper bound is set; no lower bound is set. Under the regime where proposers freely set the gas limit, there was an advantage in being able to quickly lower the gas limit when the network becomes unstable or comes under certain types of attack, and this ability is preserved under this proposal as well.
Motivation: the strain of a high gas limit
A high gas limit places greater strain on the network. Even in good faith, state and history size grow faster than the network can handle, and in a malicious case, the damage from certain DoS attacks is amplified.
Backwards compatibility, security, and testing
The source text explicitly states there are no backwards compatibility issues and no security considerations. The Test Cases section remains TBD, so specific tests have not yet been written.
Current status
This EIP is in the Standards Track Core category, and the status recorded in the source text is Stagnant. The provided call records contain no decision on whether this proposal will be included in a fork.