EIP-3368 Raising the block reward by 3 ETH with a 2-year decay (Increase block rewards to 3 ETH, with 2 Year Decay to 1 ETH Scheduled)
No call decision · Consensus & staking · EIP status Stagnant · created 2021-03-12
A proposal to raise the block reward paid to proof-of-work (PoW) miners from the current 2 ETH to 3 ETH, then gradually lower it to 1 ETH over about two years.
Why it is needed
If the block reward drops suddenly during Ethereum's transition from proof of work to proof of stake, miner profitability could collapse all at once. Miners might then rush to dispose of equipment that has become useless, or auction off their entire hash power (computing capacity) in one go. If an attacker can cheaply rent this freed-up hash power even for a short period, the risk of a 51% attack on the network rises. This proposal first raises the reward to 3 ETH to prevent a sudden profitability collapse. It then gradually lowers it to 1 ETH over about two years, giving miners time to repurpose or sell their equipment, while avoiding any long-term increase in issuance (inflation). The author presents this not as a change to apply immediately, but as a contingency measure to use if hash power swings sharply during the transition.
What changes
Today
- The block reward is fixed at 2 ETH.
- If the reward is cut suddenly during the transition to PoS, there is a risk that miner profitability could collapse.
- Miners whose profitability has collapsed might dispose of equipment all at once or auction off their hash power.
- An attacker could cheaply rent the freed-up hash power and attempt a 51% attack.
After EIP-3368
- The block reward temporarily rises to 3 ETH.
- The reward then gradually decreases over about 4,724,000 blocks (roughly two years).
- After two years, the reward stabilizes at 1 ETH.
- Miners gain time to dispose of or repurpose their equipment.
Who is affected
- PoW miners: The temporary rise followed by a gradual decline in reward gives time to dispose of or redeploy equipment.
- Users who depend on network security: The risk of exposure to a 51% attack from a sudden exodus of hash power is reduced.
- Core developers and client teams: The block, uncle, and nephew reward calculation logic and hard fork constants (such as TRANSITION_START_BLOCK_NUMBER) need to be modified.
- The PoS transition design team: This proposal is treated as a contingency measure aligned with the Minimal Viable Issuance direction and the two-year transition schedule.
In depth
Reward constants
TRANSITION_START_BLOCK_NUMBER is still TBD, and TRANSITION_DURATION is 4,724,000 blocks (roughly two years). TRANSITION_END_BLOCK_NUMBER is calculated as FORK_BLOCK_NUMBER + TRANSITION_DURATION. STARTING_REWARD is 3,000,000,000,000,000,000 wei (3 ETH), ENDING_REWARD is 1,000,000,000,000,000,000 wei (1 ETH), and REWARD_DELTA is the difference between the two, 2 ETH.
Reward calculation logic
If block.number is greater than or equal to TRANSITION_END_BLOCK_NUMBER, the reward is fixed at ENDING_REWARD. If block.number equals TRANSITION_START_BLOCK_NUMBER, STARTING_REWARD is paid in full. In between, the formula block_reward = STARTING_REWARD - REWARD_DELTA * TRANSITION_DURATION / (block.number - TRANSITION_START_BLOCK_NUMBER) lowers the reward slightly with each block. The same adjustment applies not only to the block reward but also to uncle and nephew rewards.
Motivation
The author believes that if the reward drops sharply during the transition from PoW to PoS, miners may end up dumping equipment all at once or auctioning off their hash power. This freed-up hash power creates a risk that an attacker could rent it cheaply for a short period and attack the network. Raising the reward first and then lowering it gradually can spread out the timing of miner exits rather than letting them cluster at one point, which the author explains is consistent with both the Minimal Viable Issuance principle and the two-year transition schedule to PoS.
Adoption recommendation and status
The author does not view this proposal as a change scheduled for inclusion in any particular hard fork. It states explicitly that it should only be considered as a last resort, to be used if the network ends up needing to rapidly attract hash power and then gradually let it go. The recommendation is to keep it prepared on a fast track, but not to deploy it to mainnet unless it becomes necessary.
Backwards compatibility and security
The original states that there are no known backward compatibility issues from introducing this EIP, and likewise states there are no known security issues.
Current status
This EIP's status is Stagnant, and the TRANSITION_START_BLOCK_NUMBER value required for the specification is still left as TBD. Whether it will actually be applied, and if so when, has not been decided, and the content may change or be abandoned.