EIP-2593 Escalator gas fee model (Escalator fee market change for ETH 1.0 chain)
No call decision · Fees & gas · EIP status Stagnant · created 2020-03-13
EIP-2593 proposes replacing the single-price auction with an 'escalator' scheme in which the transaction fee automatically rises over time, enabling dynamic price discovery instead.
Why it is needed
Ethereum currently sets gas fees through a first-price auction. When a block is full, users find it hard to estimate how much they need to pay to be included, repeatedly either overpaying by bidding too high or waiting too long and having to resend after bidding too low. This proposal was written at a time when EIP-1559 was being discussed as a fee market improvement, to offer a concrete alternative for comparison with 1559. The author compares user strategies and outcomes under the existing scheme, 1559, and the escalator scheme across various conditions, including a half-full block, a full block, and unpredictable surges, and argues that the escalator scheme lets users find the lowest price within their time constraint in every condition without resigning.
What changes
Today
- A transaction sets a single gasPrice, and if that price is below the market rate, it must either wait a long time or be resent.
- Users in a hurry end up overpaying by bidding higher than necessary when a block is full.
- Users who bid a low price and wait may have to resign and resend the transaction.
After EIP-2593
- By including four values in a transaction, START_PRICE, START_TIME, MAX_PRICE, and MAX_TIME, a single signature sets a price that automatically rises over time.
- Miners receive a fee linearly calculated based on the current block number.
- Users automatically arrive at the lowest possible price within their own waiting limit, without resigning or resending.
- Existing gasPrice transactions are equivalent to an 'escalator with a fixed price' and remain fully compatible.
Who is affected
- Users: A desired price range and waiting time can be set with a single signature, without needing to resend.
- Wallet developers: Clients must support four new parameters (START_PRICE, etc.) instead of gasPrice.
- Miners: Transactions must be processed by calculating the fee as a linear function of the block number.
- Cold wallet and hardware wallet developers: Existing gasPrice-style transactions can still be processed as is, so no immediate action is required.
In depth
Fee parameters
The original text makes a transaction's gasPrice value optional and instead allows four new parameters to be used. START_PRICE is the lowest price the user is willing to pay, and START_TIME is the first point at which the transaction becomes valid. MAX_PRICE is the highest price the user is willing to pay, and MAX_TIME is the point at which that MAX_PRICE is reached. Even after MAX_TIME has passed, the transaction remains valid at MAX_PRICE.
Linear price calculation function
The fee a miner receives is calculated based on the current block number, BLOCK. If BLOCK is greater than MAX_TIME, TX_FEE is simply MAX_PRICE. Otherwise, TX_FEE is a linear value calculated by the formula TX_FEE = START_PRICE + ((MAX_PRICE - START_PRICE) / (MAX_TIME - START_TIME)) * (BLOCK - START_TIME). In other words, as each block passes from START_TIME to MAX_TIME, the fee rises at a constant rate, and once MAX_TIME is passed it no longer rises and stops at MAX_PRICE.
Activation condition and fork number
This rule applies to every block where block.number is at or above INITIAL_FORK_BLKNUM. The original text only lists the INITIAL_FORK_BLKNUM value as TBD (to be determined), so the specification has not yet fixed the exact block at which the new rule takes effect. This is a client-wide parameter marking the fork point.
Motivation compared with EIP-1559
The author wrote this proposal at a time when EIP-1559 was being discussed as the leading fee market improvement, believing a concrete alternative was needed to verify 1559's advantages. The original text compares a half-full block, a full block, and repeated unpredictable surges, each combined with conditions of an urgent user and a user who can wait. In particular, it argues that when a block is full, 1559's price discovery mechanism breaks down and miners select transactions by the tip parameter, forcing users to choose between an efficient price and certainty of inclusion in the next block. The escalator scheme, by contrast, is described as letting users find the lowest price within their time constraint under every condition, without resigning.
Backward compatibility
An existing gasPrice transaction is effectively equivalent to a 'fixed escalator' transaction in which the start price and max price are the same. So this proposal does not require discarding existing transaction processing logic, and wallets that cannot immediately support the new parameters, such as cold wallets or hardware wallets, can keep working as they are for the time being.
A side effect on time reporting
The original text notes that because transaction fee calculation now directly depends on the current time, meaning the block number, miners gain an added incentive to report the current time more honestly. However, the original text gives no further explanation of exactly how this effect works.
Incomplete state
This EIP's status is Stagnant. The Test Cases and Implementation sections are both left blank as TBD, and the INITIAL_FORK_BLKNUM value has not been set either. The Security Considerations section only states 'none known at this time,' indicating that no concrete security review has been carried out.